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Regulation of Unethical Billing Practices:
Progress and Prospects
Lisa G. Lerman*
During the last ten years billing fraud by lawyers has been recognized as a
serious problem that undermines clients' trust of lawyers and the reputation of
the profession as a whole. It used to be thought that lawyers who wanted to steal
their clients' money would just take money out of the trust account. In recent
years it has become clear that dishonest lawyers' methods of misappropriation
are far more diverse than that.
The focus of this paper is on billing misconduct by lawyers who contract
with their clients to bill by the hour. I will not talk about lawyers who borrow
from their trust accounts or manipulate contingent fees. One description of the
problem we are looking at was a jingle published in the Wall Street Journal:
These newfound legal terms today,
You know they've got me reeling.
What lawyers now call overbilling
I thought was simply stealing.
Billing fraud takes many different forms:
" Some lawyers are just sloppy about keeping time records.
" Some systematically "pad" timesheets, or bill one client for work
done for another.
" Some create entirely fictitious timesheets.
Some record hours based on work done by other lawyers, paralegals
or secretaries, representing that they did the work. This may result
in nonbillable time being billed, or in work being billed at a rate
higher than that of the person who actually did the work.
Some lawyers bill for time that their clients would not regard as
legitimately billable-for schmoozing with other lawyers, chatting
with clients about sports or families, doing administrative work that
could be done by a nonlawyer, or thinking about a case while mow-
ing the lawn or watching television. The methods of expense fraud
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are equally diverse; the lawyers who engage in expense fraud may be
stealing from their clients or their partners or both.
* Some law.yers represent personal expenses to be business expenses.
Some limit themselves to getting reimbursed for personal expenses
that have a "nexus" to the work, like getting a daily massage while
in litigation, or buying a new suit while on travel. Others bill clients
for extravagant gifts and vacations regardless of whether there is a
work nexus.
* Some "doctor" receipts for legitimate expenses to increase the
amounts claimed, or manufacture receipts for expenses that were
not in fact incurred.
* Some lawyers-being "fair" to their clients-translate legitimately
billable time into billable expenses, so that the payment from the
client goes directly to the lawyer (tax free) rather than going to the
firm.
Billing fraud is far more difficult to detect than expense fraud, unless the
lawyer is stupid enough to bill more than twenty-four hours per day. But regu-
lation of this type of conduct is very difficult because no one except the lawyer
really knows how much time or money was spent and how much was billed.
Because this arena involves such a wide degree of personal discretion, those
tempted to cheat may perceive, quite accurately, that the odds of getting caught
are close to zero.
Most lawyers do most of their billing by the hour. Firms have increased
their stated and unstated annual targets and minimums for associates. Since
retention and promotion within firms is affected by hours billed, the pressure to
generate timesheets with large numbers of hours is high. I believe that this prob-
lem is in fact a hippopotamus under the bed. Many clients have glimpsed the
hippo, or have come to worry about whether the hippo is there. Some institu-
tional clients adopt billing policies-prohibiting billing for travel, disallowing
the extra associate at the deposition to bill her time, and so on. Others hire audi-
tors who pore over timesheets looking for irregularities.
The profession has just begun to look at the hippo. It isn't a pretty picture.
Whenever I talk about this topic to groups of lawyers, some people get defen-
sive, some deny the existence of the problem. But when I talk to lawyers in pri-
vate, almost every one has a story or three or seven. Even so, our disciplinary
rules do not include any specific prohibition of billing fraud, but make a gener-
al exhortation that fees must be reasonable. The ABA opinion on the topic in
1993 was a step in the direction of providing needed guidance to lawyers, but
only a first step.
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Regardless of the precise magnitude of this problem, we as a profession
must take it on. As long as some lawyers are deceiving their clients about how
much time they are spending or what they are doing, all clients worry. If clients
lose confidence that there is some objective basis for the amount they are billed,
or if clients lose confidence that their lawyers are being candid about the bases
for their bills, who could fault a client who becomes suspicious, demanding
itemization and compliance with restrictions.
Billing and expense fraud may be the number one ethical problem in our
profession. The growing financial pressure in firms has gravely damaged colle-
gial relationships and mentoring and is partly responsible for the low esteem in
which our profession is held.
I got an e-mail recently that included a raft of lawyer jokes, The jokes are a
thermometer of social concerns about lawyers. Let me share just a few examples:
"Why does the law society prohibit sex between lawyers and their clients?
To prevent clients from being billed twice for essentially the same service."
"If you see a lawyer on a bicycle, why should you never swerve to hit him?
It might be your bicycle."
"A man walked into a lawyer's office and inquired about the lawyer's rates.
"$50 for three questions" replied the lawyer. "Isn't that awfully steep?" asked
the man. "Yes" the lawyer replied, "and what was your third question?"
Most of the jokes are about mistrust and about fear of stealing. I sometimes
wonder if instead of talking about professionalism and civility, we should be
talking about lying and stealing.
Lawyers who engage in billing and expense fraud should be fired, dis-
barred, prosecuted on criminal charges, sued for malpractice. If all the relevant
public and private organizations that have some responsibility for this problem
take it seriously, I believe that we can change the norms in the profession so that
lawyers are more candid and more truthful in billing clients.
CASES OF BILLING AND EXPENSE FRAUD
I have found thirty-seven cases of lawyers who have gone to jail, been dis-
barred, or been investigated since 1989 for stealing by billing and expense
fraud. This is a new category of cases. I found no cases of this sort prior to 1989,
when this spate of cases appeared. I would like to share some information about
these cases, and comment on what the legal profession might learn from them
about detection and prevention of billing fraud.
DESCRIPTION OF A WIDELY IGNORED PROBLEM: BILLING FRAUD BY ELITE LAWYERS
My study of these cases confirm,, the views of David Wilkins, Ted Schneyer
and many other scholars that the disciplinary system performs only one of sev-
eral needed regulatory functions. The cases demonstrate the need for public
and private regulatory responses that not only receive and investigate com-
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plaints, but also provide education, prevention, proactive monitoring, and
remediation.
I searched for any cases I could find involving allegations of billing and
expense fraud. I found thirty-seven of them. From the thirty-seven cases I
selected sixteen. I chose to study cases that involved senior lawyers at presti-
gious law firms, in which the alleged billing fraud exceeded $100,000, and
which have led to prosecution or discipline. My information comes from report-
ed decisions, pleadings, and other published sources. I have talked with three
of the lawyers whose cases I am studying. I hope to talk with others.
The sixteen lawyers worked at large law firms, mostly in big cities.2 Six of
the firms are among the fifty highest-grossing US law firms in 1996.3 One of the
others is in the top 100 highest-grossing firms, two others are spin-offs from big
firms: one from Cravath, the other from Piper & Marbury.
Of the sixteen lawyers, seven were managing partners, three were heads of
departments, many had annual incomes over $500 thousand, not including the
amounts they stole. Most earned law degrees from prestigious schools: three
from NYU (LLMs), two from each of Georgetown, Northwestern, and U. of
Maryland, and one from each of Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Virginia, Michigan,
and USC. One got a Ph.D from the University of Cambridge.4
Think about this picture for a minute. The collective image of these promi-
nent lawyers getting caught stealing, not once, not for small amounts of money,
but in patterns of fraud that went on for an average of five years, is astonishing.
Their collective total proven or admitted theft is about $16 million. These high-
ly educated successful lawyers were at the pinnacle of the profession. And in
many cases it is clear that their partners knew about and/or participated in the
billing fraud.
WHAT THEY DID AND HOW THEY DID IT.
Many of the lawyers billed over 3,000 hours a year. The lawyers had a great
deal of power in their firms in part because of their high billings. The lawyers
engaged in chronic padding of hours, and wholesale fabrication of timesheets,
billing for hundreds of thousands of dollars of time not worked and charging
clients or the firms for personal expenses. Let me offer some specific examples
of the conduct that was (variously) alleged, admitted, or proven in these cases.
Ed Digges made up phony time sheets for his partners and paralegals, and
wrote over 100 checks from firm accounts for personal expenses, claiming that
they were payments to expert witnesses and other legitimate expenses. When
2. Three in Chicago, four in New York, and three in D.C.
3. Latham & Watkins; Mayer, Brown & Platt; McDermott, Will & Emery; Hunton &
Williams; Winston & Strawn; and Akin, Gump, Straus, Hauer & Feld.
4. See chart with summary of data at end of article.
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Digges' client began to suspect billing fraud, Digges' partners and their wives
spent a weekend in the office rewriting time sheets. (The wives helped so there
would be different handwriting on the time sheets.)
Stanford Hess directed that a computer program be set up to inflate time
records for one client by fifteen percent to surreptitiously avoid paying a fifteen
percent discount he had promised.
H. Lawrence Fox represented as expenses some fees that should have been
billed as time worked, so the amounts would be payable directly to him rather
than to the firm.
Bill Duker, in his capacity as managing partner of his firm, reviewed the
time sheets of other lawyers in his firm, and regularly edited them to add hours
that had not been worked.
William Appler billed some clients directly, rather than through the firm,
and had them send checks to his home address. He told the firm he was on vaca-
tion during some times when he was billing those clients. Sometimes he billed
over twenty-four hours a day.
Tim Flato bought plane tickets he didn't intend to use, cashed them in with
the airlines and then submitted the receipts for reimbursement.
Many of the lawyers got reimbursed by their firms or their clients for per-
sonal expenses: one bought an $89,000 diamond ring at Cartier's, two got reim-
bursed for purchases from Victoria's Secret, one charged the firm for thousands
of dollars of flowers for his childrens' weddings. Many of them got reimbursed
for plane tickets and other vacation expenses, tickets to sports events, club
memberships, orthodontist bills, home repairs and plumbing.
WHY DID THEY DO IT?
A few of the lawyers had mental health problems of one sort or another, bi-
polar illness in one case and less serious problems in the others. Some of the
lawyers' judgment may have been impaired by alcohol or other drugs. A few of
the lawyers seemed to be really sleazy people, greedy masters of the universe
with little or no actual integrity.
What is surprising is that most of them are not like that, and quite a few of
them were fine lawyers and decent honest people who slid into patterns of con-
duct that they may not have fully realized were improper. In some cases they
may have been doing just what everyone else in the firm was doing, but some-
one noticed or someone was after them so they got nailed for it. What we ,are
seeing in these cases is a process of criminalization, in which conduct that once
might have led to a "dutch-uncle" talk with the managing partner now leads to
disciplinary or criminal action. Because the articulated rules on billing are so
vague, many lawyers are caught in a bind where they are under pressure from
their firms to increase their billings, and they don't have any clear guidance
telling them what is or is not okay. As a profession we are far from consensus on
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what billing practices are improper. Should lawyers bill only for time spent pro-
viding professional services? Can one bill for sleeping on the plane or watching
the movie, or is that only okay if your client knows that you are doing it? Do you
have to tell your client that you were billing for time you spent thinking while
watching Seinfeld, or do you only have to tell about the T.V. if the client asks?
Opportunity and lack of oversight appears to be a significant contributing
factor. Many of the managing partners had unfettered discretion in their own
billings and expenses, and in "editing" the timesheets of others.
Firm culture is another major culprit. Many of the lawyers appear to have
been affected by competitive pressures, and by adopting lifestyles that required
more income than they could generate honestly. At least a couple of lawyers
were doing a great deal of public service or pro bono work, so their billable
hours did not produce the incomes they needed to pay their mortgages, their
childrens' tuitions, and so on.
Many law firms evaluate and compensate lawyers primarily on the basis of
the number of hours they bill. The preoccupation with income has led some
firms to set billable hour requirements so high that they virtually require billing
fraud. In 1965 associates' annual billings averaged 1300 hours. By 1988 the
average in New York had risen to 2300 hours. These numbers tell a big part of
this story. Unlike a dollar, an hour in 1965 was still an hour in 1988.
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, DISCIPLINE, AND CIVIL LIABILITY
Law enforcement and disciplinary agencies have done a good job in these
cases. All sixteen cases have been investigated, and nearly all have led to disci-
pline. Most have been prosecuted. Nine lawyers were criminally charged; all
were convicted or pled guilty. Eight received prison sentences, which averaged
thirty-four months. Many were ordered to pay restitution. Thirteen of the
lawyers were disbarred or indefinitely suspended.
The fact that these cases have resulted in law enforcement does not mean
that this problem is under control. To assess the overall effectiveness of law
enforcement, one would have to know how many other lawyers are out there
manufacturing fake timesheets and not getting caught. These cases may repre-
sent the tip of an iceberg.
Civil suits have been brought against many lawyers and firms for malprac-
tice, breach of fiduciary duty or wrongful discharge. Lots of the law firms have
reimbursed clients and then sued their former partners. Many lawyers have
been ordered or have agreed to pay damages for their billing and expense fraud.
Ed Digges' partners were found jointly liable with him for $3.1 million for mal-
practice; the malpractice insurer was found not liable. A juror in the Digges mal-
practice case voiced his opinion that Digges' partners were held liable because
"none of them gave a [expletive deleted] as long as they were getting their
money." The specter of joint liability may provide a powerful disincentive to tol-
erance of billing fraud.
REGULATION OF UNETHICAL BILLING PRACTICES
The effort involved in investigating and prosecuting these cases cannot be
underestimated. Filing charges against a partner in a large firm is a resource
intensive undertaking. But criminal prosecution, even of a small number of
cases, may provide an effective deterrent to other lawyers. Lawyers, like other
professionals, usually have jobs, families and reputations to protect. Most have
never been arrested or charged with a crime. Deterrence may be more effective
in dealing with white collar offenders than with criminals who have less to lose.
CHANGES IN LAW FIRMS
Prosecution and disciplinary action are necessary, but this problem cannot
be solved without some other regulatory changes and dramatic changes in law
firms. One way to discourage billing fraud would be to prohibit law firms from
setting explicit or unspoken annual targets for associates and partners, and pro-
hibiting the use of data on hours billed as a factor in retention, promotion, com-
pensation or bonus decisions. This sounds preposterous, but think about it.
The firms are putting enormous pressure on employees to bill more hours.
Should we be surprised that some of them become cavalier about whether they
actually work the hours they bill? Also notice that this reform might be as inef-
fective as it is unlikely. Even if law firms did not set overt targets or minimums,
the expectations could be communicated informally. As long as the principal
method of billing is by the hour, I fear this problem will dog our profession.
Many corporate clients and government agencies have begun auditing legal
bills. But the external auditors only catch a tiny fraction of the misconduct that
occurs. Also, many clients can't afford to hire auditors. In recent years many
states have started random audit programs to monitor client trust accounts. It
would be useful to have random audit.programs to monitor billing and expense
fraud. One could begin by auditing those who billed over 3,000 hours per year.
Law firms need to become more intolerant of billing fraud, and courts need
to provide remedies for lawyers who are fired for raising concerns about uneth-
ical conduct. Some firms are on top of this problem, but then there are others.
Four of Scott Wolas' partners at Hunton & Williams were co-investors on a
multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme. Three associates began complaining to the
firm about the partner's billing fraud, but the firm conducted no investigation
until eighteen months after the complaints were first made, and then did not
report any misconduct because the investigation did not "prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" that Wolas engaged in billing fraud. The managing partner told
the complaining associates that Wolas was not a "dirty rat" but merely a "slop-
py pig." The associates later were fired or eased out of the firm. Now they are
suing for wrongful discharge. Wolas disappeared, but before he went into hid-
ing, he repaid his partners who had invested in his scheme.
Although nine or ten of the law firms reported the billing fraud to prose-
cutors or disciplinary authorities, some firms made no report of the misconduct
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or delayed reporting for up to two years. At Weinberg and Green, the partners
met at least eighteen times over six months to discuss what to do about Stanford
Hess' computer-assisted billing fraud scheme. They disagreed about whether
the conduct was improper.
One way to discourage tolerance of billing and expense fraud would be to
do what has been done in Illinois, and enforce the reporting rules against
lawyers who know about and fail to report such conduct by other lawyers.
Lawyer reporting of misconduct increased enormously after the Himmel deci-
sion, both in Illinois and in branch offices of Chicago law firms.
The legal profession aspires to many ideals. Most lawyers are genuinely
committed to professionalism and client service. But some lawyers don't share
these values. They may or may not be educable, but even if one cannot sell them
on integrity, one might be able to raise the price of misconduct high enough to
change their behavior.
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SIXTEEN CASES OF BILLING AND EXPENSE FRAUD
a summary of data from a work in progress
Nameiawschool Firm wherq mis- Allegedamount Jailsentence Discipline or
wherelawyer conduct occurred, stolen& dates (months)& resignation
earnedJD&year position alleged yearimposed
1 Edward S. Digges, Wharton $3.1M 30 disbarred MD
Digges, Jr. and Levin', 1984 - 1989 1989 -90 & US Sup.
Maryland '71 Annapolis, MD, Ct. 1990
managing partner
2 Harvey Myerson, Myerson & Kuhn', $2.5M 70 Suspended
Columbia '64 New York, manag- 1980- 1989 1992 pendinghear-
ing partner ingonsanction
NewYork 1992
3 Wilkes "Skip" Bronson, Bronson $2.3M 24 Resigned CA
Morgan, & McKinnon, 1984 - 1991 1993 1992
Hastings '73 Santa Rosa office,
managing partner
4 H.LawrenceFox, Winston & Strawn, $1.62M 55 resignedVA
Virginia '64 DC office, manag- 1986 -1991 no parole 1992 and US S.
ing partner 1992 Ct. 1992 dis-
barred DC 1993
5 Maureen Walsh,' Chapman & Cutler, $1.48M' 12 Petition for
Northwestern, '80 Chicago, non-equi- 1991 - 1994 1997 Interim
ty partner Suspension
filed 9/97
6 William F.Duker, Dukerjlarrett, SAM sentencing disbarred New
Yale '81 Gravante&Markel, 1990- 1995 scheduled for York 9/97
New York, manag- 11/20/97
ing partner
7 WilliamAppler, McDermott, Will S1.1M not prosecut- disbarred DC
Georgetown '69 & Emery, DC, 1986. 1991 ed 1995
non-equity partner
5. Before Mr. Digges started the firm of Digges, Wharton and Levin, he was managing
partner at the law firm of Piper and Marbury.
6. Before he started the law firm of Myerson & Kuhn, Mr. Myerson was managing partner
and head of the litigation department at Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley,
Myerson & Casey.
7. Maureen Walsh Fairchild was married to Gary Fairchild. The disciplinary complaint refers
to Maureen as Maureen Walsh because she was listed by that name on her license to practice law.
The criminal indictment refers to her as Maureen Walsh Fairchild. I refer to her as Maureen Walsh.
8. Maureen Walsh was charged by the disciplinary agency in Chicago with having overbilled
clients and her low firm by $1.48 million. The subsequent criminal indictment charged her with
mail and wire fraud of $900,000. The discrepancy between these two amounts was not explained.
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NRme,lawschool Firm where mis- - Allegedamount Jailsentence Disciplineor
wherelawyer conduct occurred, stolen& dates (months)& resignation
earnedJD&ycar position alleged yearimposed
8 Gary Fairchild, Winston & $784T 24 1995 voluntary dis-
Northwestern '69 Strawn, Chicago, 1984 - 1994 3 yrs. sus- barment IL
managing partner pended 1994
9 Michael X. Akin, Gump, $500T none reported disbarred DC
Morrell, Strauss, Hauer & 1985- 1990 in press 1996
Georgetown '68 Feld,DCofcounsel
10 Webster The Rose Law $457T 21 disbarred by
Hubbell, Firm, Little Rock, 1989 - 1994 1994 consent AR
Hastings '73 managing partner 1995
James T. Thompson, Hine $385T none reported suspended
11 Crowley, and Flory, 1990 - 1992; in press indefinitely
Michigan '68 Cleveland, partner, one incident in Ohio 1994
chairman of litiga- 1987
tion dept.
12 Timothy Flato, Latham&Watkins, $300 - 400T 6H resigned from
USC '81 San Francisco, part- 1991 - 1994 1996 CA bar 1996
ner, head of project
group.
13 Richard Mayer, Brown & $254T none reported disbarred by
Solomon, Platt, Chicago, 1990- 1994 in press. consent IL
Harvard '79 partner 1994
14 Sherman Taub, Tenzer, $225T none reported resigned New
New York Law Greenblatt, Fallon 1991 - 1994 in press York 1996
School '71 & Kaplan, New
York, tax partner
15 Stanford Hess, Weinberg&Green, $110T none reported Petition for
Maryland '66 Baltimore, partner 1984- 1987 in press Disciplinary
Actionfiled
10/20/97;hear-
ingheld 1/20/97
16 Scott J. McKay Hunton&Williams, unknown criminal no action taken
Wolas, Fordham partner, head of liti- approximately investigation to date
'76 gation dept. in NY pending
office
9. Mr. Flato was sentenced to six months home detention. See Howard Mintz, Flato
Sentence: Six Months of Home Detention, THE RECORDER 1 (uly 29, 1996) (Mintz 96c).
